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Abstract 
 
It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of 
independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board 
independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This f ollows because a lack of board 
independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the 
incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. 
While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model 
suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the 
problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe). 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Board Independence; Severance Pay; CEO Turnover; 
Incentive Compensation 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The extent to which greater board independence beneﬁts shareholders is the subject
of much debate. There is a widespread belief that boards controlled by independent
outside directors do a better job of monitoring the CEO than boards controlled by
inside directors. For this reason, boards of directors are typically viewed as most
valuable to shareholders when they are fully independent from the CEO. In line
of this view, new corporate governance rules adopted by the NYSE and NASDAQ
require that ”a majority of the board of directors must be comprised of independent
directors...”1 Institutional investors, the Business Roundtable, and many others put
forward similar proposals.2
This paper shows that pushing for majority independent boards does not neces-
sarily lead to an improved corporate governance structure. Rather, I ﬁnd that the
optimal degree of board independence is a decreasing function of the severity of the
agency conﬂict inherent in governing the organization.
To sketch the idea, consider a ﬁrm where the board of directors is responsible
for motivating the CEO to exert high eﬀort and replacing him if necessary. To
make a good decision on CEO replacement, the board requires additional information
regarding the prospects of the current corporate strategy. This information, however,
is private to the CEO. The CEO will only reveal unfavorable information that leads
to his own dismissal when the board provides generous severance pay. Severance pay
1The NASDAQ interpretation of an independent director is ”...a person other than an oﬃcer or
employee of the company or its subsidiaries or any other individual having a relationship, which, in
the opinion of the company’s board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.”
2See Baghat and Black (2001) for references and further examples.
2insulates the CEO from the cost of being ﬁred and therefore helps in eliciting bad
news. But since severance pay is costly, the board seeks to reduce the expected cost
of inducing truthful reporting. Intuitively, this can be achieved by committing to
use the revealed information less aggressively against the CEO. However, providing
severance pay is not only directly costly but also indirectly costly in that it undermines
management incentives to exert eﬀort. When the CEO realizes that he can cash in
a golden handshake after performing poorly, he has much less incentive to do a good
job in the ﬁrst place. The ex ante eﬃcient CEO replacement rule therefore trades oﬀ
the beneﬁts of a good decision on CEO replacement with the cost of inducing truthful
reporting and motivating high eﬀort.
I model a lack of board independence by assuming that directors reap a private
beneﬁt if the incumbent CEO retains control. This retention beneﬁt may arise because
directors’ careers are linked to the CEO’s, ﬁring the CEO sheds unfavorable light on
other (managing) directors, directors and the CEO have strong personal ties, or the
board simply enjoys socializing with the incumbent (see Mace 1971). The level of the
retention beneﬁt is a measure for the board’s degree of independence.3 The larger
this beneﬁt, the less independent is the board from the CEO and the less likely it is
that the incumbent CEO is ﬁred. This is consistent with the standard view that less
independent boards are less eﬀective on certain tasks, such as replacing the CEO.
In a world with full commitment, shareholders are best served by boards that are
fully independent from the CEO (i.e., boards that have no preference for keeping the
incumbent). In this case, the independent board designs a contract that implements
a relatively ”soft” (i.e., non-aggressive) CEO replacement policy. However, when the
3For alternative ways to model board independence see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998),
Hermalin (2004), and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2004).
3board is unable to commit not to engage in mutually beneﬁcial renegotiation, a fully
independent board is no longer desirable. When it comes to the CEO replacement
decision, a fully independent board ﬁn d si te xp o s tb e n e ﬁcial to become more active.
Renegotiation therefore may result in the board oﬀering the CEO a larger amount
of severance pay, intended to induce the CEO to step down. This kind of renegotia-
tion is indeed observed in corporations: Bebchuk and Fried (2004) give cases where
departing CEOs obtained gratuitous goodbye payments in addition to the contrac-
tually mandated severance payments. Renegotiation is an issue because it leads to
CEO replacements that are eﬃc i e n tf r o ma ne xp o s tp e r s p e c t i v eb u ti n e ﬃcient from
an ex ante point of view. For this reason, putting directors in charge that lack some
independence from the CEO can increase ex ante shareholder value. A board that
is dependent on the CEO adopts a CEO replacement rule which is less aggressive
and closer to the shareholders’ ex ante eﬃcient rule. Put diﬀerently, a lack of board
independence is a means of alleviating the commitment problem induced by rene-
gotiation.4 Contrary to standard arguments, the model suggests that independent
boards (dependent boards) are most valuable if the incentive problem of motivating
high eﬀort is weak (severe).
The two papers most similar in spirit to this work are Aghion and Tirole (1997)
and Levitt and Snyder (1997). Both papers show that limiting the principal’s degree
of intervention can foster management incentives. The paper is also related to the
growing literature on boards.5 Almazan and Suarez (2003) discuss the impact of CEO
4Arya, Glover, and Routledge (2002) and Arya and Glover (2003) make a related point. They
show that delegating authority to an agent who has diﬀerent preferences than the principal can be
value enhancing as it mitigates commitment issues.
5For an overview of this literature see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).
4turnover on incentive contracting and show that some degree of CEO entrenchment
can improve corporate governance. My paper diﬀers from theirs in that it focuses
on the role of board independence in corporate governance. Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) consider a dynamic relationship between the CEO and the board. Board com-
position (i.e., board independence) is the result of a bargaining process between the
CEO and directors. In contrast, I analyze the optimal degree of board independence
from shareholders’ perspective and show that some lack of independence can increase
shareholder value.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 analyzes a
benchmark situation where the CEO has commitment power. Section 4 presents the
main results and Section 5 provides some empirical implications. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
Consider a game with three risk-neutral players: shareholders, a board of directors
and a CEO. The board of directors hires a CEO to implement a risky project. The
CEO undertakes a productive action, denoted a ∈ {aL,a H}. The private cost asso-
ciated with action a is v(a), where v(aH) >v (aL). For simplicity, let v(aH)=v and
v(aL)=0 . It is commonly known that project proﬁtability, denoted θ, follows a dis-
tribution function F(θ|a) with positive density f(θ|a) over the interval [0,1].M o r e
eﬀort shifts the probability distribution to the right in the sense of ﬁrst order sto-
chastic dominance, F(θ|aL)−F(θ|aH) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0,1].I no r d e rt oa v o i dat r i v i a l
solution, assume shareholders always wish to induce the CEO to work hard (a = aH).
The proﬁtability θ denotes the probability that the project succeeds. In case of a suc-
cess, the project generates net revenues of xH > 0.I nc a s eo faf a i l u r e ,w h i c ho c c u r s
5with probability (1 − θ), the project generates net revenues of xL < 0.T h e r ee x i s t s
ac r i t i c a lc u t o ﬀ level, θ
z, with the properties θ
z ∈ (0,1) and θ
zxH +( 1− θ
z)xL =0 .
Thus, the project has a positive net present value (NPV) if θ > θ
z and a negative
NPV if θ < θ
z. The realized outcome of the project is veriﬁable.
After the CEO has selected his action, he privately uncovers the project prof-
itability θ. This information is valuable because the ﬁr mc a ne x e r c i s ea no p t i o nt o
terminate the risky project and to pursue a safe strategy instead. The net rev-
enue of the safe strategy is normalized to zero. Given the threshold level under
which the risky project is terminated, denoted b θ, the expected NPV is given by
E[NPV(b θ)] =
R 1
b θ (θxH +( 1− θ)xL)f(θ)dθ. Assume that E[NPV(b θ)] is concave in b θ.
The board of directors is responsible for contracting with the CEO and replacing
him if necessary. If bad news is revealed (low θ), an active board replaces management
and simultaneously terminates the risky project and goes for the safe strategy.6 Let
r ∈ {0,1} be an indicator variable that denotes whether the CEO is ﬁred. If r =
1, the incumbent CEO is removed and corporate strategy is changed and if r =
0, he is retained and the risky project is run to completion. Consider a message
contingent revelation mechanism, where the CEO is asked to send a report e θ. The
contract (r(e θ),s(e θ),w H(e θ),w L(e θ)) speciﬁes the replacement decision r(e θ), the amount
of severance pay s(e θ) g r a n t e dt ot h eC E Oi fh ei sﬁred, and the wages wH(e θ) and
6What matters here is the abandonment of the project (given bad news) and not the removal
of the CEO. However, there are many potential (but unmodeled) reasons for a CEO turnover:
f o re x a m p l e ,p o o rp e r f o r m a n c e( l o wθ) may update believes about the ability of the incumbent, a
diﬀerent business strategy may call for a diﬀerent type of CEO, or the incumbent CEO may be
reluctant to support the new ﬁrm strategy. There is empirical evidence by Weisbach (1995) that
changes in corporate strategy are often accompanied by CEO turnovers.
6wL(e θ) paid to the CEO if he is retained and the risky project turns out to be a
success, x = xH, or a failure, x = xL, respectively. The reservation utility of the CEO
is normalized to zero. The CEO has no private wealth which implies that payments
to the CEO must be nonnegative. Since all parties are risk neutral, it is optimal to set
the pay wL as low as possible, i.e., wL =0 . Note that s(θ1)=s(θ2) must hold for all
θ1,θ2 for which r(θ1)=r(θ2)=1 . Otherwise the CEO sends the report that results
in the highest amount of severance pay. Equivalently, since wL =0 ,w H(θ1)=wH(θ2)
must hold for all θ1,θ2 for which r(θ1)=r(θ2)=0 . In addition, it can be shown that
there exists a unique threshold b θ, such that r(e θ)=1for all e θ ≤ b θ and r(e θ)=0for all
e θ > b θ.7 Thus, the contract above can be characterized by the triplet (b θ,s,w H), where
b θ is the threshold under which the CEO is ﬁred.
Except for Section 3 (which considers a benchmark solution), I assume the board
cannot commit not to renegotiate the terms of the initial contract. After sending
the report e θ,t h eb o a r dm a yo ﬀer the CEO to replace the existing contract with a
new one. Renegotiation takes place by common agreement and does not stand for a
unilateral breach of contract. As will be seen later, renegotiation results in the board
oﬀering the CEO greater severance pay intended to convince him to step down.
Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), I assume that the preferences of the
individual directors can be aggregated to one (collective) utility function for the board.
The board of directors may have a preference for keeping the incumbent CEO. In
particular, I assume that the board obtains a private beneﬁt, denoted δ ≥ 0, if the
incumbent is retained. Apart from this beneﬁt, directors have similar preferences than
shareholders. The factor δ can be interpreted as a measure of board independence:
the greater δ, the less independent is the board from the CEO. Given the standard
7See Levitt and Snyder (1997).
7view that outside directors are more independent, δ is expected to increase with the
proportion of inside directors on the board. The degree of board independence, δ, is
observable to all parties.
The model has the following timing:
Stage 1: In the beginning, the board oﬀers the CEO a contract. The CEO decides
whether to participate in the relationship and, if so, which action to take.
Stage 2: The CEO privately uncovers the proﬁtability of the project, θ, and makes
ar e p o r te θ.
Stage 3: The board of directors may engage in mutually beneﬁcial renegotiations.
Depending on the terms of the (new) arrangement, the incumbent either stays or
leaves the ﬁrm.
Stage 4: Cash ﬂows are realized and the incumbent CEO (if in control) is paid
contingent on the contract.
3 Benchmark: The Commitment Case
As a starting point, consider the case where the board is able to commit not to
renegotiate the contract. From the revelation principle it is known that it is suﬃcient
to consider only mechanisms where the CEO reports truthfully. The board solves the
following problem (recall that wL =0 )
max
b θ,s,wH
Z 1
b θ
(θ(xH − wH)+( 1− θ)xL)f(θ|aH)dθ − F(b θ|aH)s +
Z 1
b θ
δf(θ|aH)dθ (1)
subject to
s = b θwH, (2)
8Z 1
b θ
θwHf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)s − v (3)
≥
Z 1
b θ
θwHf(θ|aL)dθ + F(b θ|aL)s,
wH,s≥ 0. (4)
Constraint (2) ensures that the CEO reports the true project proﬁtability: if
θ ≤ b θ, the CEO prefers to be ﬁred and obtain severance pay s (hence he reports
e θ ≤ b θ)a n di fθ > b θ, the CEO prefers to be retained (hence he reports e θ > b θ).
The incentive constraint (3) guarantees that the CEO chooses aH instead of aL.
The nonnegativity constraint (4) requires payments to be nonnegative. The CEO’s
participation constraint is slack and hence is omitted.
In the optimum, (3) is binding. Substituting (2) into (3) and rearranging yields
wH =
v
B(b θ)
, (5)
with B(b θ) ≡
R 1
b θ θf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)b θ −
R 1
b θ θf(θ|aL)dθ − F(b θ|aL)b θ.
In Appendix A, I show that the board’s optimal ex ante threshold level, denoted
b θ
A
(A for ex ante), satisﬁes
−
³
b θxH +( 1−b θ)xL
´
f(b θ|aH) − F(b θ|aH)
v
B(b θ)
(6)
−v
R 1
b θ θf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)b θ
B(b θ)2
³
F(b θ|aL) − F(b θ|aH)
´
− δf(b θ|aH)
=0 .
The board’s optimal contract under commitment is therefore given by b θ = b θ
A
,
s = b θwH,w H = v
B(b θ),w L =0 .
9Severance pay plays a crucial role in eliciting a truthful report. The CEO will
only reveal information that leads to his own dismissal when he is reimbursed via
severance pay.8 However, since severance pay is costly, the board seeks to reduce
the expected cost of inducing truthful reporting. Intuitively, this can be achieved by
committing to CEO replacement rules which are less aggressive.
Providing severance pay is costly not only directly but indirectly because it under-
mines management incentives to exert high eﬀort. When the CEO knows that he can
cash in a generous severance pay after performing poorly, he has much less incentive
to work hard on the project in the ﬁrst place. Thus, in order to maintain the right
incentives, the reward wH must increase if the severance pay s increases. Since the
level of severance pay depends on the CEO replacement rule, motivating high eﬀort
is less costly (wH is lower) if the board is less active in replacing the CEO.
In determining the ex ante eﬃcient CEO replacement rule (the optimal b θ), the
board of directors takes into account both the cost of inducing truth-telling and the
cost of motivating high eﬀort (as expressed in the second and the third term of (6)).
The board also considers its preferences for keeping the incumbent (as expressed in
the last term of (6)) and the beneﬁts of a change of strategy associated with CEO
turnover (as expressed in the ﬁrst term of (6)).
S h a r e h o l d e r s ’e xa n t ee ﬃcient threshold level is given by (6) where δ =0 . When the
board is fully independent (δ =0 ) , directors and shareholders have similar preferences.
In this case, the board maximizes ex ante shareholder value which leads to Lemma 1.
8The role severance pay plays in this model is related to the view expressed by Lambert and
Larcker (1985) and Jensen (1988). These papers argue in a takeover context that severance payments
(golden parachutes) reduce executives’ inclination to hamper takeovers that might jeopardize their
jobs but are valuable to shareholders.
10Lemma 1 In the commitment case, shareholders are best served by boards that are
fully independent from the CEO (δ =0 ) .
4N o C o m m i t m e n t
4.1 Outcome with Renegotiation
In the rest of the paper I assume that the board is unable to commit not to engage in
mutually beneﬁcial renegotiation. The board’s ex post eﬃcient replacement strategy
(i.e., the strategy which is optimal in state 3) is characterized by
−
³
b θxH +( 1−b θ)xL
´
f(b θ|aH) − δf(b θ|aH)=0 . (7)
Let b θ
P
(P for ex post) denote the threshold that satisﬁes (7). The ex post eﬃcient
CEO replacement strategy is more aggressive than the ex ante eﬃcient one, i.e.,
b θ
P
> b θ
A
. This arises because in stage 3 the board no longer cares about the cost of
inducing truth-telling and the cost of motivating high eﬀort.
T h eb o a r d ’ se xa n t ee ﬃcient contract is not robust to renegotiations. To see this
suppose the CEO reports proﬁtability e θ ∈
h
b θ
A
, b θ
Pi
. Given the initial contract, the
incumbent CEO is not subject to replacement. But since retaining the CEO is ex
post ineﬃcient, the board induces the CEO to step down by oﬀering a more generous
severance pay s = e θwH.T h eC E Oi sn ow o r s eo ﬀ with this oﬀer and agrees to leave.
Of course, in the end the CEO sees through the board’s incentives to renegotiate and
reports e θ = b θ
P
for all θ ≤ b θ
P
. Note that renegotiation will not take place with respect
to the payments wH and wL. Intuitively, wH and wL are merely transfer payments
that do not aﬀect the size of the pie. It is therefore impossible to alter these payments
11without making one party strictly worse oﬀ.9
Without loss of generality I restrict attention to renegotiation proof contracts. The
optimal separating contract is given by b θ = b θ
P
,s= b θwH,w H = v
B(b θ) and wL =0 .
This contract implements the board’s ex post eﬃcient CEO replacement rule and is
therefore renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 1 Suppose the degree of board independence, δ, is exogenous. As the
board becomes more independent,
(i) the CEO replacement rule becomes more aggressive (b θ
P
decreases with δ),
(ii) the CEO obtains a larger severance pay (s decreases with δ)
(iii) the CEO obtains a larger reward for success (wH decreases with δ).
Result (i) of Proposition 1 arises because a board that is dependent on the CEO
has an interest in keeping him. The greater the lack of independence, the less likely
it is that the incumbent CEO is ﬁred. This is consistent with the standard view that
less independent boards are less eﬀective on certain tasks, such as replacing the CEO.
Results (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 follow because a more aggressive decision on
CEO replacement is associated with a larger severance pay s and a larger reward wH
as discussed in Section 3.
A corollary to Proposition 1 is:
Corollary 1 As the board of directors becomes more independent, the CEO can ex-
tract larger rents from the ﬁrm.
9This result holds since both parties are risk neutral. In the case of managerial risk aversion,
alterations of the payments wH and wL c a nl e a dt oi m p r o v e dr i s ks h a r i n ga n dt h e r e f o r et oi n c r e a s e d
ex post eﬃciency (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1990).
12The CEO is better oﬀ with a board of directors that is more independent. This
is a surprising result since it is widely believed that CEOs are better able to extract
rents when boards lack independence (Bebchuk and Fried 2003, 2004). The result in
the corollary arises because the CEO has private information, which the board wishes
to elicit. When the board is more independent and, hence, more active in replacing
the CEO, the incumbent is less willing to reveal bad news. This increases the amount
of severance pay required to elicit a truthful report and, in turn, the required reward
wH.
4.2 The Optimal Level of Board Independence
In this section, I analyze the optimal degree of board independence δ from sharehold-
ers’ perspective. Since the board is unable to commit not to engage in renegotiations,
the board will adopt the CEO replacement rule that is ex post eﬃcient (from the
board’s point of view). If the board is fully independent from the CEO (and there-
fore has similar preferences than shareholders), the CEO is ﬁred whenever the project
has a negative NPV (i.e., b θ = θ
z). This outcome is undesirable from an ex ante per-
spective because it is associated with excessive incentive costs. If, however, the board
lacks some independence from the CEO, the board’s ex post eﬃcient ﬁring decision
is less aggressive and closer to the shareholders’ ex ante eﬃcient one. The optimal
degree of board independence is such that the board’s ex post eﬃcient CEO replace-
ment rule corresponds to the shareholders’ ex ante eﬃcient rule. This is the case
for
δ = v
R 1
b θ θf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)b θ
f(b θ|aH)
F(b θ|aL) − F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)2 +
F(b θ|aH)
f(b θ|aH)
v
B(b θ)
. (8)
Putting directors in charge who have preferences for keeping the incumbent CEO
(and therefore have diﬀerent preferences than shareholders), leads to a CEO replace-
13ment rule that maximizes ex ante shareholder value.
Proposition 2 The lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commit-
ment. The optimal degree of board independence is a function of the severity of the
incentive problem as measured by v.
The board composition that is commonly perceived as the ideal one, namely that
the board is comprised entirely of independent directors (δ =0 ) , is optimal only if
there is no underlying incentive problem between shareholders and the CEO (v =0 ) .
In all other cases, some lack of board independence is desirable.
The proof of the next proposition is provided in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the degree of board independence, δ, is chosen optimally.
As the severity of the incentive problem increases,
(i) CEO replacement becomes less aggressive (b θ decreases with v),
(ii) the optimal degree of board independence decreases (δ increases with v),
(iii) the CEO obtains a larger reward for success (wH increases with v).
Result (i) of Proposition 3 follows because if the incentive problem becomes
stronger, the ex ante incentive contracting beneﬁt associated with a softer policy
on CEO replacement increases. Result (ii) of Proposition 3 arises because in order to
ensure less aggressive decisions on CEO replacement, a board is required that is more
dependent on the CEO; that is, result (ii) follows from result (i). Consequently, and
in contrast to what has frequently been argued, independent directors are most valu-
able to shareholders if the incentive problem inherent in governing the organization is
weak. Finally, result (iii) follows because if v increases, additional performance pay
must be granted to the CEO to maintain the right incentives.
145 Discussion
Over the last three decades there has been a trend toward greater board independence
in the U.S. and other countries (see Bhagat and Black 2001 and Hermalin 2004 for
discussions). The large shift in board composition over time seems unlikely to be an
endogenous (optimal) response to changes in ﬁrm characteristics. Rather it is likely
driven by conventional wisdom, regulatory and other external pressures (Bhagat and
Black 2001). If this is the case, the current model provides the following implications
which follow directly from Proposition 1.
Implication 1 As board independence increases, (i) CEOs are more often ﬁred, (ii)
severance pay increases and (iii) performance based pay increases.
Part (i) of Implication 1 is consistent with the evidence in Huson, Parrino, and
Starks (2001) and Weisbach (1988). Huson et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the fraction of CEO
dismissals has been risen over the period in which board independence increased (they
use data from the period 1971 to 1994). Using the proportion of outside directors
as a measure for board independence, Weisbach (1988) ﬁnds that CEO dismissal
is more sensitive to poor performance when boards are more independent. This
observation is typically viewed as some evidence that independent boards do a better
job of monitoring the CEO and therefore improve corporate governance. However,
this argument does not account for the potential adverse eﬀects board activism has
on management incentives.
Part (ii) of Implication 1 matches the evidence in Lefanowicz, Robinson, and
Smith (2000) and Yermack (2004). Lefanowicz et al. (2000) ﬁnd that ﬁrms increased
the use and scope of golden parachutes over the period 1980 to 1995. Yermack (2004)
observes that CEOs obtain larger severance payments if the proportion of outsiders
15on the board is greater.
Support for part (iii) of Implication 1 is provided by several studies including Hall
and Liebman (1998). They ﬁnd that executive compensation increased substantially
during the period 1980 to 1994. The implication also matches the evidence by Core,
Holthausen and Larcker (1999). Using a sample of 205 U.S. ﬁrms, they ﬁnd that CEO
compensation increases with the proportion of outside directors on the board.10
There is no clear answer to the question what is driving the trend toward greater
board independence. As just mentioned, changes in board composition could be the
result of regulatory and other pressures. However, the current model shows that the
trend toward greater board independence can also be the result of CEOs gaining more
inﬂuence over the board selection process. As discussed in Section 4, CEOs prefer
more independent boards because these boards tend to be more aggressive on CEO
removal which translates into larger severance pay and performance compensation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that the current push for highly independent boards in organizations
does not necessarily lead to an improved corporate governance structure. Boards that
are dependent on the incumbent CEO remove poorly performing CEOs less often
than boards that are independent. Since this behavior is ineﬃcient ex post, it is often
viewed as some evidence that dependent boards are ineﬀective monitors. However,
10Hermalin (2004) makes a similar prediction but for a diﬀerent reason. He assumes that more
independent directors are more diligent in monitoring the CEO’s talent. When the board is more
inclined to monitor, the CEO will exert more eﬀort in an attempt to distort a signal about his talent.
Hermalin argues that the utility loss of the increased eﬀort must be compensated via increased pay.
Hence, greater board independence is associated with larger executive compensation.
16softer policies on CEO replacement have beneﬁcial ex ante incentive eﬀects. Due
to these incentive eﬀects, independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable
when the agency problem inherent in governing the organization is weak (strong).
Throughout the paper, I assume that the board is unable to commit not to engage
in mutually beneﬁcial renegotiations. This lack of commitment is the reason why de-
pendent directors can be valuable to shareholders. However, one might argue that
shareholders cannot commit not to replace directors either. Ex post (i.e., in stage 3)
shareholders have an interest to replace a board that lacks independence with a board
that is fully independent since a dependent board is only desirable ex ante. However,
there are mechanisms that can prevent shareholders from replacing the board of direc-
tors at short notice. One prominent example is staggered boards. Staggered boards
insulate a majority of the board of directors from being replaced before the passage
of two annual elections. Although staggered boards are typically seen to be against
shareholders’ interests (Bebchuk, Cohen 2004; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2004),
such an arrangement can actually be useful in alleviating commitment concerns.
17Appendix
Appendix A. Substituting (2) into (1) and letting λ be the multiplier on (5), the
Lagrangian formulation of the problem is
max
b θ,wH
Z 1
b θ
(θ(xH − wH)+( 1− θ)xL)f(θ|aH)dθ − F(b θ|aH)b θwH +
³
1 − F(b θ|aH)
´
δ
+λ
³
wHB(b θ) − v
´
.
The ﬁrst order conditions on b θ and wH are
−
³
b θ(xH − wH)+( 1−b θ)xL
´
f(b θ|aH) − f(b θ|aH)b θwH − F(b θ|aH)wH (9)
−δf(b θ|aH) − λwH
³
F(b θ|aL) − F(b θ|aH)
´
=0 ,
−
Z 1
b θ
θf(θ|aH)dθ − F(b θ|aH)b θ + λB(b θ)=0 . (10)
Rearranging (10) yields
λ =
R 1
b θ θf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)b θ
B(b θ)
. (11)
Substituting (11) into (9) gives (6).
Appendix B.
Let R(b θ) ≡
³R 1
b θ θf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)b θ
´
F(b θ|aL)−F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)2 .
Note that R0(b θ)=F(b θ|aH)
F(b θ|aL)−F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)2 +
³R 1
b θ θf(θ|aH)dθ + F(b θ|aH)b θ
´
f(b θ|aL)−f(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)2 +
2R(b θ)(F(b θ|aL)−F(b θ|aH))
B(b θ) .
Let G ≡−
³
b θxH +( 1−b θ)xL
´
f(b θ|aH) − vR(b θ) − v
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ) , which is zero in the
optimum.
Note that G0 = ∂G
∂b θ = −(xH −xL)f(b θ|aH)−(b θxH +(1−b θ)xL)f0(b θ|aH)−vR0(b θ)−
v
f(b θ|aH)
B(b θ) −v
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)2
³
F(b θ|aL) − F(b θ|aH)
´
, which must be negative to ensure an interior
solution.
18We have now
db θ
dv
= −
∂G
∂v
∂G
∂b θ
= −
−R(b θ) −
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)
G0 < 0.
Recall that δ = v
f(b θ|aH)
³
R(b θ)+
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)
´
.
Hence,
dδ
dv
=
1
f(b θ|aH)
Ã
R(b θ)+
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)
!
− v
f0(b θ|aH)
f(b θ|aH)2
Ã
R(b θ)+
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)
!
db θ
dv
+
v
f(b θ|aH)
Ã
R
0(b θ)+
f(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)
+
F(b θ|aH)
B(b θ)2
³
F(b θ|aL) − F(b θ|aH)
´
!
db θ
dv
,
which is positive (assuming that f0(b θ|aH) is not too negative).
Finally,
dwH
dv
=
1
B(b θ)
Ã
1+
v
B(b θ)
³
F(b θ|aL) − F(b θ|aH)
´ db θ
dv
!
> 0.
which is positive (assuming that f(b θ|aL) − f(b θ|aH) is not too negative).
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